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Natural Philosophy 
Ann Blair∗ 
 
“Natural philosophy” is often used by European historians as an umbrella term to 
designate the study of nature before it can easily be identified with what we call 
“science” today, to avoid the modern and potentially anachronistic connotations of 
that term.  But “natural philosophy” (and its equivalents in different languages) was 
also an actor's category, a term commonly used throughout the early modern period 
and typically defined quite broadly as the study of natural bodies.  As the central 
discipline dedicated to laying out the principles and causes of natural phenomena, 
natural philosophy underwent tremendous transformations during the early modern 
period.  From its medieval form as a bookish Aristotelian discipline institutionalized 
in the universities, natural philosophy became increasingly associated during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries with new authorities, new practices and new 
institutions, as is clear from the emergence of new expressions, such as the 
“experimental natural philosophy” of Robert Boyle (1627-91) and the Royal Society 
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of London or the Mathematical principles of natural philosophy (Philosophiae 
naturalis principia mathematica, 1687) of Isaac Newton (1642-1727).1 
 Traditional natural philosophy (that is, of the bookish, largely Aristotelian, 
variety) continued to prevail in university teaching through much of the seventeenth 
century [See GRAFTON], but it too was transformed by the innovations of the 
period, which prompted attempts at adaptation as well as staunch resistance.  By 
1700 it had yielded definitively in all but the most conservative contexts to the 
mechanical, mathematized natural philosophies of Cartesianism and Newtonianism.2 
 Nonetheless the term “natural philosophy” continued to be current (notably in 
English) through the eighteenth century, its broad scope left intact by the transitions 
to new methods and explanatory principles.  The concept and the term were replaced 
starting in the early nineteenth century by the emergence and professionalization of 
specialized scientific disciplines, with which we are familiar today, from biology and 
zoology to chemistry and physics.3 
 
The University Context of Natural Philosophy 
 
“Philosophia naturalis” served as a translation of Aristotle's physikê êpistêmê and 
was also called “physica” or “physice” (a shortened version of the same 
expression).4  It originally designated one of the three branches of speculative 
philosophy delineated by Aristotle, alongside mathematics and metaphysics.5 As 
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institutionalized in the universities of medieval Christendom, starting in the 
thirteenth century, natural philosophy consisted in the study of and commentary on 
Aristotle's libri naturales.  These comprised (as in the regulations of Paris, 1255, 
equivalents of which prevailed in universities throughout Europe): Aristotle's 
Physics, On the Heavens, Meteorology, On the Soul, On Generation and Corruption, 
the History and Parts of Animals, the shorter works known collectively as the parva 
naturalia—including On Sleep and Waking, On Memory and Remembering, On 
Life and Death—and two tracts now considered of doubtful authenticity, On Causes 
and On Plants.6  But, given the special emphasis on logic in the medieval 
curriculum, natural philosophy was generally reduced in practice to the study of the 
Physics on the one hand (with some consideration of On the Heavens and 
Meteorology) and On the Soul on the other (with some reference to the parva 
naturalia).7  At the University of Paris for example, once Aristotle had become the 
centerpiece of the curriculum in the mid-thirteenth century, a candidate for a 
bachelor's degree took only a minimum of natural philosophy, and focused primarily 
on grammar and logic. Natural philosophy featured mostly in the two years of 
additional course work for the master's degree, which was required in order to teach 
or to continue on to a higher faculty (i.e., law, medicine, or theology).8  Despite 
variations between institutions, some of which offered more instruction at the 
undergraduate level in the quadrivium (the mathematical disciplines of arithmetic, 
geometry, astronomy, and music), this basic pattern remained the norm in Europe 
 4 
until the end of the seventeenth century. 
 Broadly speaking, the institutional structures of the medieval universities 
remained in place throughout the early modern period.  But the rapid expansion in 
higher education starting around 1500 and the new technology of printing fostered 
new pedagogical developments.  Throughout Europe students attended universities 
in greater numbers in the sixteenth century; the dates at which attendance curves 
peaked varies from place to place, from around 1590 in Castile to 1660 in Louvain.9 
 About 100 new universities were founded between 1500 and 1650 (while ten 
existing universities were abolished, transferred or merged in the same period).  The 
new foundations were often associated with a religious offensive.  In the first half of 
the sixteenth century they clustered in Spain, affirming the effects of the 
reconquista—that is, the “reconquest” of Spain from its Muslim and Jewish 
inhabitants.  After the peace of Augsburg (1555) established the principle of 
religious territoriality (cujus regio, eius religio), new universities multiplied in the 
principalities of central and Eastern Europe, as each region needed schools 
appropriate to its ruler's religious choice.10 
 The growth of state bureaucracies also required more educated elites to fill 
them, prompting the formation of new educational institutions.  These included the 
collèges de plein exercice at the University of Paris and the Jesuit colleges founded 
across Europe, which offered instruction independent of the faculty of arts that 
combined a secondary education in Latin and elementary Greek grammar and 
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rhetoric, with two or more years of university-level work devoted to philosophy.  
Students could attend such colleges alongside or instead of university courses for the 
B.A., although degrees could only be conferred by the universities near which these 
colleges were often located.11  Special schools also catered to the sons of the nobility 
(Ritterakademien in the Empire; collegi dei nobili in Italy; gymnasia illustria in the 
United Provinces; academies like that of Pluvinel in France).12  Finally, the various 
religious orders and the secular clergy ran monastic schools and seminaries to train 
their members. 
 The general trend across Europe during the sixteenth century, under 
confessional and administrative pressures to educate more students faster (notably to 
serve as preachers and bureaucrats), was to compress subjects previously reserved 
for the later into the earlier years of study.13  As a result more students were exposed 
to instruction in natural philosophy, notably for the B.A.  This trend, combined with 
the spread of printing, fueled a great increase in the number and kinds of books of 
natural philosophy, particularly of the pedagogical variety.14  For the professors 
there were numerous editions, translations, commentaries and specialized treatises, 
whether of the traditional scholastic or the newer humanist variety.15  Humanist 
editions and translations strove to strip away the legacy of the medieval Arabic 
transmission in favor of a translation from the Greek original into elegant Ciceronian 
Latin.  Humanists delved into the newly recovered Greek commentaries on Aristotle 
from late Antiquity, for example by Themistius (first published in Latin in 1481), 
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Alexander of Aphrodisias (first published in Latin in 1495), or Simplicius (first 
published in Greek in 1499), but the medieval commentary of Averroes, a scholastic 
favorite, remained standard for many university professors.16 
 For students, aids to the acquisition of Aristotelian natural philosophy 
included Latin editions shorn of cumbersome commentaries, but instead enhanced 
with such trappings as summaries, dichotomous tables, and indexes.  The genre of 
the philosophical textbook, which offered a succinct compendium or manual of 
natural philosophy, flourished in the sixteenth century.17  Catholic textbooks were 
often structured around the traditional medieval quaestio, a question in “whether” 
(e.g., whether the world is eternal?) around which one gathered arguments, 
objections and responses to objections in favor of alternative solutions before 
reaching a conclusion.18  Protestant textbooks, on the other hand, straying more 
readily from medieval practice and in imitation of Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560), 
who was the first to include Aristotle in the Lutheran curriculum, tended to pose 
simplified questions (“what is the world?”) that called for definitions and 
descriptions rather than subtle argumentation, and might be answered by a series of 
numbered propositions.19 
 Most notorious for their pedagogical reductions of complex material were 
the Calvinist pedagogues who followed the French educational reformer Petrus 
Ramus (Pierre de La Ramée, 1515-72).  They favored the use of dichotomous tables, 
from the disposition of which the student would supposedly be able to master any 
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topic.  For example, a textbook by Wilhelm Scribonius, already in its fourth edition 
in 1600, presented a vast topic like animals by providing the proper subdivisions of 
it without any descriptions or explanations.  Scribonius divided animals into rational 
and irrational, the latter into those living in water and those on land, the land animals 
into reptiles and quadrupeds, the quadrupeds into oviparous and viviparous, the 
viviparous into those with cleft hooves and those with solid hooves, and so on.20  
Textbooks of these various kinds insured a broad diffusion among students of the 
basic elements of Aristotelian physics. 
 Although the flow of university texts, from theses and textbooks to 
commentaries and treatises, continued exclusively in Latin into the 18th century, the 
first vernacular textbooks of Aristotelian natural philosophy, starting in 1595, 
testified to the broadening of the audience seeking a university-style education.  
These books probably appealed to privately tutored noblemen, to students so weak 
in Latin that they needed a vernacular crib, to intellectually ambitious barber-
surgeons or artisans (such as the potter Bernard Palissy, c. 1510-90), and to women, 
as one dedication suggests.21  The authors of these works complained of the 
difficulty of their task, which required coining new vernacular terms, to match 
technical Latin ones, but they were no doubt proud, as one voluble French translator 
was, to satisfy the desires of “those very studious in French books ...  who had often 
begged [him] to give them some book in French to attain knowledge of the secrets of 
nature” and in so doing to “enrich, embellish and adorn our language after the 
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example of the ancients.”22  None of Aristotle’s actual writings about nature were 
translated into vernaculars, however.  A set of problems offering questions and 
answers about the human body and health circulated in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries as the Problemata Aristotelis (Problems of Aristotle), in Latin and in 
German, French and English translations, but this text was composed in the Middle 
Ages and bore no relation to the ancient Problems now identified as pseudo-
Aristotelian.23  This work is representative of the most popular extension of 
Aristotelianism, alongside collections of sayings or short excerpts attributed to 
Aristotle that were also available in Latin and in the vernacular, such as Jacques 
Bouchereau's Flores Aristotelis (Flowers of Aristotle, first published 1560) or 
William Baldwin's Sayings of the Wise (first published 1547).24 
 The extent to which formal changes in the transmission of natural 
philosophy at the Renaissance universities made the discipline particularly more 
open to new ideas is debatable.  The medieval quaestio, after all, lent itself perfectly 
well to departures from Aristotle's original concerns or arguments, although 
medieval authors tended to mask their innovations rather than point them out.25  
Renaissance commentaries certainly gave their authors a wide berth for innovation, 
allowing for digressive discussions that could stray from the initial passage or 
opinion at issue.26 Textbooks, in which the author constructed a systematic 
presentation of his own, albeit within an Aristotelian framework, have been hailed as 
the “pedagogical expression of a serious revolution, that which gave birth to 
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Descartes.”27  Each of these forms offered opportunities for modifying the tradition 
even as they transmitted it. 
 Rather than singling out the Renaissance as a time of decadent or eclectic 
Aristotelianism, recent scholarship has emphasized the vitality and variety of 
Aristotelian philosophy throughout the nearly 500 years of its dominance (c. 1200-
1690).  Indeed there never was a period characterized by the spread or imposition of 
a monolithic interpretation of Aristotle.  Medieval Aristotelianism had always 
embraced a wide range of positions, from Averroism to positions tinged with 
Platonism, such as those of Thomas Aquinas on the soul, to the nominalist probes of 
the limits of reason, in Scotism and Ockhamism; the quaestio itself as a form 
encouraged awareness of the multiplicity of possible arguments and solutions.  In 
the analysis of the historian of science Edward Grant, flexibility was a central 
feature of Aristotelianism as a philosophical system and the key to its long survival.  
Aristotle's own obscurities and ambiguities precluded agreement on any one 
interpretation, so that variety of interpretation was perforce the norm.  At the same 
time Aristotelian principles, with their near universal applicability, could be used to 
generate new theories and respond to new concerns (as in medieval theology, for 
example).  Furthermore, the fact that natural philosophy was fragmented into 
hundreds of separate quaestiones (e.g., on Aristotle's Physics book IV: is place 
immobile? is the concave surface of the moon the natural place of fire? is every 
being in a place? is the existence of a vacuum possible? is a resisting medium 
 10 
required in the motion of bodies?) masked the inconsistencies generated by that 
flexibility and discouraged debate about the system as a whole.28 
 Aristotelian natural philosophy faced a number of challenges in the 
Renaissance, stemming from a new awareness of alternative ancient philosophies, 
the resurgence of religious objections, and recent empirical observations and 
discoveries, as I will describe below.  But the result was hardly a turn away from 
Aristotle: as Charles Lohr pointed out, "the number of Latin Aristotle commentaries 
[in all fields] composed between 1500 and 1650 exceeds that of the entire 
millennium from Boethius to Pomponazzi."29  Of all the areas to which 
commentaries on Aristotle could be devoted, natural philosophy was second only to 
logic in the number of commentaries produced; at least one third of all Aristotle 
commentators wrote on one or more aspects of natural philosophy—more than those 
who wrote on metaphysics, ethics, rhetoric or politics combined.30  Printing and the 
expansion of higher education doubtlessly account for the explosive nature of this 
growth of Aristotelica.31  But these figures are eloquent testimony to the fact that 
Aristotle was still the Philosopher to print, to teach, and to study. 
 Aristotle alone came complete with interpretive formulations finely honed 
over centuries of debate and reflection, which adapted his philosophy to the needs 
and concerns of Christian orthodoxy.  Only for Aristotle did there already exist a 
vast arsenal of pedagogical presentations and tools suitable for students at various 
levels, on which professors could build without having to start from scratch.  Finally, 
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given its flexibility, Aristotelianism had the resources with which to respond to 
many of the new challenges.  As a result these challenges generated more 
interpretations and adaptations, rather than a decline in Aristotelianism. Institutional 
and intellectual factors together can account for the continued vitality and increased 
productivity of Aristotelian natural philosophy through the first half of the 
seventeenth century.  Aristotelianism remained the common philosophical ground of 
the Renaissance, the point of reference in relation to which every new philosophy 
had to prove its tenability.32 
 
Aristotelianism and the Innovations of the Renaissance 
 
Charles Schmitt has outlined two different kinds of eclecticism, or openness to 
innovation, evident in Aristotelian natural philosophy.  The first, already present in 
the Middle Ages, was an openness to new developments that emerged within the 
tradition.  The second involved a willingness to draw on sources outside that 
tradition and was a specific characteristic of Aristotelianism in the early modern 
period.33  In the first instance, the universities of the Renaissance inherited the full 
range of Aristotelian positions found in the Middle Ages, displaying plenty of 
internal eclecticism: Thomists and Scotists were widespread throughout Europe; 
Italian universities were known for their Averroists; in Germany there were also 
Albertists; at the University of Krakow in the sixteenth century Aristotle was "still 
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read with the eyes of John Buridan," while in early sixteenth-century Paris Spanish 
scholars like Juan de Celaya (1490-1558) and Luis Coronel (d. 1531) followed the 
calculatory tradition of fourteenth-century Oxford.34  Not only were there 
disagreements between these scholastic “sects,” but there were equally important 
disagreements within them, because of the variety of ways of being a “Thomist” or 
an “Averroist.”35 
 In addition, during the Renaissance, Aristotelian natural philosophers faced a 
number of new challenges, which originated outside the universities and outside the 
Aristotelian tradition—from the humanists and the newly recovered ancient sources 
they made available, from the Protestant and Catholic Reformations and their 
concern to make philosophy better serve religion, and from the emergence of new 
empirical observations and mathematical methods.  The responses of Aristotelian 
natural philosophers ranged from the selective adoption of certain innovations to 
conservative defenses of received opinion. 
 The humanists fostered the study of a “new Aristotle” based on new, more 
elegant Latin translations (e.g., by Leonardo Bruni [1369-1444] and Theodore Gaza 
[1400-76]), a new emphasis on Aristotle’s ethical and political writings, and newly 
recovered ancient commentaries (by Themistius or Simplicius for example).  Italian 
humanists also revived a number of other ancient philosophical authorities, 
including Plato and Hermes Trismegistus, the legendary Egyptian priest, Epicurus 
and the skeptic Sextus Empiricus.  Although various works of Plato, including the 
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Timaeus, with its account of the origins of the world, had been available in Latin in 
the Middle Ages, the arrival of Byzantine émigrés in fifteenth-century Italy gave a 
new seriousness to the study of Plato as a philosopher.  Georgios Gemistos Pletho (c. 
1360-1454) was exceptional in promoting Plato with the idea of rebuilding the 
polytheistic paganism of ancient Greece.36 Most humanists valued Plato instead as a 
buttress to Christianity, and adduced in support of this interpretation the writings of 
the Neoplatonists, especially Plotinus (205-269/70) and Proclus (c. 410-85).  Early 
proponents of Plato did not necessarily attack Aristotle.  Although George of 
Trebizond framed his Comparatio Platonis et Aristotelis (Comparison of Plato and 
Aristotle, 1458) as a preemptive defense of Aristotle against the Platonists, other 
humanists attempted to reconcile the two, following the Byzantine position that the 
two philosophers were fundamentally in agreement.37 
 The Florentine philosopher Marsilio Ficino (1433-99) was the first to 
develop Platonism into a system complete enough to rival Aristotle's.  Ficino 
composed voluminous translations of and commentaries on Plato and the hermetic 
texts and offered his own synthesis of Christianity and Platonism in his Theologia 
platonica (composed around 1474, published in 1482).  He contrasted this "pious 
philosophy" with what he considered the impieties of scholastic Aristotelianism.38  
Defenders of Plato maintained that Plato's belief in individual immortality and in the 
creation of the world by a divine Demiurge made his philosophy more easily 
reconciled with Christianity, but critics noted the difficulties posed by Plato's belief 
 14 
in the transmigration of souls and by the fact that the creation described in the 
Timaeus was not a creation ex nihilo, but rather from pre-existing matter.  Platonism 
found support here and there throughout the early modern period, for example 
among German mystics, from Nicholas of Cusa (1401-64) to Jakob Boehme (1575-
1624); or from isolated individuals like Symphorien Champier (c. 1470-1539) in 
France and Leo Ebreo (c. 1460-1523) in Portugal, down to Henry More (1614-87) 
and Ralph Cudworth (1617-88), who as fellows at Cambridge used Platonism to 
combat materialist interpretations of the new mechanical philosophy.39  Only in 
Italian universities were a few professorships created for the teaching of Platonism 
alongside the usual Aristotelianism: in Pisa (1576), Ferrara (1578), and Rome 
(1592), the latter two having been created for Francesco Patrizi (1529-97) in 
particular.40 
 The impact of Renaissance Platonism and Hermeticism on scientific 
developments has been much debated.  Frances Yates argued that the Neoplatonist 
emphasis on the successive emanations from a perfect being to lower and lower 
orders of existence helped inspire enthusiasm for heliocentrism, which placed the 
sun at the center of vital emanations of heat and light.41 [See COPENHAVER]  But 
most thinkers inspired by Platonism or Hermeticism remained hostile to 
Copernicanism.42  The notable exceptions, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600) and 
Johannes Kepler (1571-1630), each also had other motivations for their choice of 
heliocentrism.  Bruno embraced Copernicanism in the context of an infinitist 
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cosmology, which he justified as a tribute to divine omnipotence, free from the 
standard cosmological and physical assumptions.43  Johannes Kepler hailed 
Copernicanism as mathematically superior because it established the order of and 
distance between the planets and aided him in his goal of elucidating the geometrical 
or musical harmonies present in these relationships.44  The impact of Platonism on 
Galileo has long been a matter of debate; recent work has emphasized the need to 
consider, in this controversy, how Platonism was understood in the Renaissance 
rather than in our time.45  At this point, Platonism can plausibly be credited with 
fostering a renewed interest in geometrical-mathematical methods, which a few 
Italian professors of philosophy hailed as a replacement of the dry logicism of 
Aristotle.46  In addition, Platonism offered one of the first viable alternatives to 
Aristotelian natural philosophy and helped to challenge some of its specific 
assumptions, including, for example, the Aristotelian notion of the quintessence, a 
fifth element peculiar to the superlunary world that distinguished it from the sub-
lunary.47 
 Other philosophical alternatives to both Aristotle and Plato were brought to 
light by humanist discoveries of long-lost manuscripts.  Ancient atomism, for 
example, was first revived with the discovery in 1417 by Poggio Bracciolini of a 
manuscript of Lucretius' De natura rerum (On the nature of things) in the library of a 
Swiss monastery.  The translation by Ambrogio Traversari of Diogenes Laertius' 
Lives of Eminent Philosophers (first published in 1533) gave a new currency to the 
 16 
opinions of many ancient figures, including Epicurus, who had long been dismissed 
as a mere libertine.48  The Stoics too were proposed, notably by Justus Lipsius 
(1547-1606), as offering an alternative and more pious natural and moral philosophy 
than Aristotelianism.49  The Presocratics and the Pythagoreans also appealed, 
especially to philosophers in the Platonic vein. 
 Hostility to Aristotle was especially widespread among a group of late-
sixteenth-century Italian philosophers often called “nature philosophers” because of 
their emphasis on natural philosophy.50  [see GARBER]  Although innovative, their 
philosophies remained speculative, without empirical or mathematical components, 
and were stymied by the Counter-Reformation Church, which exhibited a preference 
for Aristotle and the Thomist synthesis after the Council of Trent (1545-63).51  
Among the earliest of these critics of Aristotle was the Italian physician and 
polymath Girolamo Cardano (1501-76) who, for example, reduced Aristotle's four 
elements to three by eliminating fire as an element.  Despite incurring an accusation 
of heresy for casting a horoscope of Christ in 1570 and a scathing attack by Julius 
Caesar Scaliger in defense of Aristotle, Cardano acquired an international reputation 
for his books of natural philosophy as well as his practice of medicine and 
astrology.52  Francesco Patrizi developed a more systematic new philosophy to 
replace Aristotelianism in his Nova de universis philosophia (New Philosophy of the 
Universe, 1591), which relied on Platonic sources to portray God as an incorporeal, 
intellectual light, who pours forth light and heat to create the world, generating 
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successively lower and lower levels of being.  Despite the initial favor of pope 
Clement VIII, the book was placed on the Index of Forbidden Books in 1594; Patrizi 
continued to teach Platonic philosophy, first in Ferrara then in Rome, until his death 
in 1597, but at that point the papal theologian Robert Bellarmine, who as cardinal 
would later take a stern line against Galileo, concluded that Platonism was more 
dangerous to Christianity than Aristotelianism and recommended that his chair of 
Platonic philosophy be suppressed.53 
 Offering yet another alternative to received philosophy, Bernardino Telesio 
(1509-88) rejected Aristotelianism on the grounds that it was in conflict with the 
senses and with Scripture and instead explained the natural world as the interaction 
between the two principles of hot and cold.  In order to Christianize this revival of 
pre-Socratic naturalism, he introduced a universal spirit (also reminiscent of Stoic 
pneuma), which infused the world and from which he drew new definitions of time 
and space.  Telesio's works were condemned posthumously in 1593.54  Tommaso 
Campanella (1568-1639), a disciple of Telesio, carried the idea of the world-spirit to 
the extreme of envisioning the whole universe as a living animal in which God was 
omnipresent and immanent (“pansensism”).  Nature was full of correspondences and 
divine messages that the natural philosopher could interpret, especially through 
astrology.  Imprisoned in 1599 for fomenting rebellion in Calabria against Spanish 
domination there, Campanella spent most of the next 30 years in jails; he was 
released in 1629 by pope Urban VIII and practiced astral magic with him to ward off 
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evil celestial influences, and when Spain threatened to have him extradited, he fled 
to France in 1634.  He had the support there of a circle of "libertine" philosophers, 
who increasingly became disillusioned with his querulous demands for greater 
recognition.55  Finally, Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), drawing on a wide range of 
sources including the atomist Lucretius, his contemporary Telesio and Neoplatonists 
like Plotinus and Nicholas of Cusa, suggested that all matter is infused by soul.56 
Rather than proposing a pious philosophy, like that of Ficino however, his solution 
was to subsume religion under a rationalistic worldview and it was probably this 
naturalism rather than any particular aspect of his theories (such as Copernicanism) 
that led to his being burnt at the stake for heresy in 1600.57 
 Although these Italian nature philosophers did not succeed in unseating 
Aristotle from his position of philosophical dominance and, given the persecution 
they faced, did not garner many followers, they did leave their contemporaries and 
successors with an increased awareness of the possibility of developing viable 
philosophical alternatives to Aristotelianism.  Criticism of Aristotle on specific 
issues for his obscurity and internal inconsistencies became increasingly common.58 
 While some tried to develop an entire philosophy based on an ancient authority 
other than Aristotle, others combined Aristotelianism with positions borrowed from 
a mix of the different thinkers that had recently been rediscovered.59  Philosophical 
diversity also prompted two new kinds of responses: syncretism on the one hand and 
skepticism on the other.   
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 Giovanni Pico della Mirandola (1463-94) set the standard for the syncretic 
position, in gathering 900 theses drawn from a wide range of philosophical 
traditions, from the medieval Arabs to the hermetic texts, with the idea of showing 
that each philosophical tradition was an incomplete manifestation of a single 
(Christian) truth.  Although this work (the Conclusiones, 1486) was condemned by 
pope Innocent VIII in 1488, it was widely read and cited in the Renaissance, in part 
for its doxography (i.e., its collection of philosophical opinions) and in part for its 
syncretic approach, which was perpetuated by Francesco Giorgi (1460-1540) and 
Agostino Steuco (1497-1548) among others.60  By contrast, Giovanni Pico's nephew 
Gianfrancesco Pico della Mirandola (1469-1533) concluded from the same variety 
of philosophical opinion that all philosophy is false, and that only the Christian faith 
offers certainty.  The persistent appeal of this skeptical, fideist position in the 
sixteenth century, to authors ranging from Henricus Cornelius Agrippa von 
Nettesheim (1486-1535) to Michel de Montaigne (1533-92) and Francisco Sanchez 
(1550/1-1623),61 prompted René Descartes (1596-1650), Marin Mersenne (1588-
1648), and Francis Bacon (1561-1626), among others in the early seventeenth 
century, to look for a more solid foundation than philosophical authority on which to 
ground natural knowledge. 
 
The Impact of the Reformations and of Religious Concerns 
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A second challenge to received Aristotelianism stemmed from the renewal of moral 
and religious objections.  Francesco Petrarca, or Petrarch (1304-74) was one of the 
first to mock Aristotelianism as sterile and irrelevant to the real (ethical and 
religious) concerns of life.  Petrarch complained bitterly of those who attacked him 
because he refused to worship Aristotle as they did and instead pointed out the 
limitations of philosophical knowledge when compared with the rewards of religious 
contemplation: 
 
 Thus we come back to what Macrobius says .... “It seems to me that there 
was nothing this great man [Aristotle] could not know.” Just the opposite 
seems to me true.  I would not admit that any man had knowledge of all 
things through human study.  This is why I was torn to pieces, and ... this is 
what is claimed to be the reason: I do not adore Aristotle.  But I have another 
whom to adore.  He does not promise me empty and frivolous conjectures of 
deceitful things which are of use for nothing and not supported by any 
foundation.  He promises me the knowledge of Himself.62 
 
Petrarch raised the classic Christian objections to Aristotle, which had motivated the 
condemnation of Aristotelianism when it was first introduced in the universities in 
the thirteenth century.63 
 Although Aristotle had so rapidly and effectively been Christianized 
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(through the work of Thomas Aquinas among others) that by 1325 he had become 
the standard philosophical authority in universities, religious objections to Aristotle 
became once again a powerful line of attack against his authority in the 
Renaissance.64  In particular Aristotle's discussions of the eternity of the world, the 
necessity of natural law and the immortality of the soul were not obviously in 
agreement with Christian doctrines about the creation of the world, the possibility of 
miraculous exceptions to the laws of nature, and the survival and judgment of the 
individual soul after death.  Throughout the early modern period natural 
philosophers had to show how Aristotelianism or any other philosophical system 
they would prefer to it could be reconciled with Christian doctrines on these issues.  
As a result the eternity of the world and the immortality of the soul were often 
standard topics in early modern natural philosophy.65 
 At the same time as the humanists leveled these strictures against 
scholasticism, the Church also became increasingly hostile to the scholastic 
separation between philosophy and theology that gave philosophers in the faculty of 
arts a degree of institutional and intellectual independence.  Instead, at the Fifth 
Lateran Council (1512-17), the Church called on philosophy to play an active role in 
supporting religious doctrines and launched an offensive in particular against the 
Averroist strand of Aristotelianism represented in many Italian universities.  The 
Council mandated that philosophers demonstrate the immortality of the soul, 
whereas a number of scholastic philosophers had long since concluded that this 
 22 
question could not be resolved on philosophical grounds alone. 
 Defending the independence of philosophy from such religious mandates, 
Pietro Pomponazzi (1462-1525), professor at Padua, flaunted the decree of the 
Lateran Council in his On the immortality of the soul (1516), in which he concluded 
that the soul could be shown on purely rational grounds to be mortal rather than 
immortal.  After a papal condemnation in 1518, Pomponazzi published a 
Defensorium including orthodox proofs of the immortality of the soul and refrained 
from publishing his other highly naturalistic treatments of fate and miracles.66  
Nonetheless, Paduan Aristotelians continued to be known for their commitment to 
naturalistic Aristotelianism.  Cesare Cremonini (1550-1631), for example, did not 
attempt to Christianize his interpretation of Aristotle's position on the eternity of the 
world and denied the intervention of God in the sublunary realm; for this he was 
investigated by the Inquisition, though he retained his high-paying position at the 
University of Padua.67  But Cremonini remained the exception.  Over the course of 
the sixteenth century most Aristotelian natural philosophers conformed to religious 
tenets or avoided questions with theological implications, leaving them to 
metaphysics.68 
 More generally, the new awareness of the shortcomings of Aristotle even 
among Aristotelians led them to think of themselves as increasingly independent 
philosophers.  For example, the German professor of philosophy Bartholomaeus 
Keckermann (1571-1609) distinguished the “bad Peripatetics,” who were concerned 
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only with what Aristotle said, from the good ones, like himself or the Paduan 
philosopher Jacopo Zabarella (1533-89), who pursued the truth beyond what 
Aristotle had established.69  Indeed Zabarella described his goal as the pursuit of 
reason rather than Aristotelian authority.  In his treatises on logic and method he 
drew on the full range of sources available in his day, including medieval and the 
newly recovered ancient commentaries as well as sources outside the Aristotelian 
tradition.70  Many late Aristotelians justified taking liberties with their chosen 
authority by reiterating in various forms a dictum first coined by Aristotle himself to 
explain his own independent search for truth: “amicus Plato, sed magis amica 
veritas” (“Plato is my friend, but truth is a greater friend”).71  For example, the 
general of the Dominican order, Thomas de Vio, known as Cardinal Cajetan (1468-
1534), preferred Thomas Aquinas as an authoritative philosopher to the Aristotle 
whom Aquinas was supposedly interpreting.  In response to Pomponazzi's 
irreligious interpretation of Aristotle, Cajetan concluded that Aristotle had deviated 
from the true principles of philosophy, notably on the question of the immortality of 
the soul.72 
 Among Protestants, the desire to be rid of the medieval legacy of 
scholasticism led to an initial contempt for Aristotle, most notably by Luther.  After 
an early attempt to use lectures on Pliny and natural history as an introduction to 
natural philosophy, Philip Melanchthon (1497-1560) returned to Aristotelian 
categories and scholastic methods in devising the Lutheran curriculum.73  Among 
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Calvinists, there was some attempt, notably by the French theologian Lambert 
Daneau (1530-95), to devise a "Christian physics" based primarily on the Bible.74  
But even Daneau strove to reconcile Aristotelian opinion with the Biblical 
statements.75  In the main, the Calvinist professors of philosophy at the new German 
universities composed Aristotelian textbooks where the usual topics were “reduced” 
according to Ramist principles.  Lutheran and Calvinist commentators on Aristotle 
readily relied on and cited Catholic authorities like Suarez or Zabarella.76  Although 
the reverse was less often the case (presumably due to Catholic censorship), this 
cross-confessional contact is evidence of the fundamental similarities between 
Catholic and Protestant Aristotelianism. 
 The Reformations, both Protestant and Catholic, also had an impact on the 
justifications of natural philosophy, in bringing back to the fore a concern for 
Christian (and not specifically denominational) piety.  Textbooks of all confessions 
framed natural philosophy as a pious exercise.  In what he boasted was the first work 
of its kind, a Compendium naturalis philosophiae (1542), the Franciscan Frans 
Titelmans began with a three-page prose “psalm to the Creator, the one and triune 
Lord” and each of the twelve books into which his 400-page work was divided 
closed with similar psalms.  This intermingling of psalmic piety with a pedagogical 
exposition of Aristotle would not become a lasting feature of the textbook genre, but 
it reveals the uneasiness of the author in presenting Aristotle “straight up,” especially 
to the broad and inexperienced readership targeted by an introductory textbook.  
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Through the psalms Titelmans meant to give concrete expression to his objectives, 
which remained the refrain of all natural philosophy textbooks and treatises for well 
over a century: 
 
 I saw that the discipline of physics, if it was treated rightly and according to 
its dignity, was of the greatest importance to sacred Theology and for the 
fuller knowledge of God; and led in an admirable fashion not only to the 
knowledge of God, but also to excite the love of God: which two things (that 
is, the knowledge and the love of God) must be the final and principal end of 
all honorable studies.77 
 
Similarly, Protestant textbooks, following the lead of Melanchthon, praised natural 
philosophy as an incitement to piety for revealing the benevolent providence of God. 
 The actual practice of natural philosophy was not much affected by these 
reiterations, but they gave renewed prominence to natural theological arguments 
from design that defended the existence and worship of God against what 
contemporaries perceived as a threat from the rise of atheism.78 
 Given its general natural theological usefulness, natural philosophy elicited 
considerable agreement across confessional lines, not only within Christianity, but 
also among the Jewish minorities concentrated in Italian cities and in central and 
Eastern Europe.79  Although Jews were not often included in the natural 
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philosophical discussions among Christians in the early modern period, the late 
Renaissance (c. 1550-1620) was a period of relative openness of Jewish thinkers to 
Christian scientific developments.80  In particular David Gans (1541-1613), who 
lived in Prague and maintained contacts at the court of Rudolf II, notably with 
Tycho Brahe (1546-1601) and Johannes Kepler, tried to promote natural philosophy 
among his Jewish contemporaries in the hope of enhancing relations between Jews 
and Christians.  He saw in natural philosophy a theologically neutral area by the 
study of which Jews could improve their standing among Christians.81 Although 
Gans' works were not published in his day and scientific study remained peripheral 
in Jewish education, rabbis like Moses Isserles in Cracow and the Maharal (Judah 
Loew ben Bezalel) in Prague encouraged naturalistic pursuits and recognized natural 
philosophy as a legitimate sphere of knowledge separate from the sacred.  In 
addition, the number of Jews studying medicine at Padua rose steadily from the 
sixteenth to the eighteenth centuries, ensuring the diffusion of a secular medical 
training to Jews who returned to practice medicine in their towns of origin.82  
Nevertheless, the attractiveness of the kabbalah with its very different mode of 
thought on the one hand and the pressures of the well-established pattern of cultural 
isolation in which most Jews lived on the other kept in check a wide acceptance of 
natural philosophy in Jewish circles.83 
 
New Scientific Observations and Practices 
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Aristotelian natural philosophers responded to new scientific observations and 
practices, in such areas as astronomy, natural history, or magnetism, which 
originated outside the universities.  The development during the Renaissance of new 
sites of scientific practice, such as observatories, laboratories, princely courts, 
foreign travel, or technical schools providing instruction in navigation and other 
mathematical arts generated new approaches to nature quite foreign to the bookish 
and disputatious methods of Aristotelian natural philosophers.84  Bypassing the 
university's once solid monopoly on scientific discourse, in the sixteenth century 
autodidacts and artisans could, thanks to printing, both learn from and contribute to 
widely diffused discussions about nature. [See BENNETT] For example, Niccolò 
Tartaglia (1499/1500-1557), the son of a post-rider, who taught himself 
mathematics, from the alphabet to the solution to third-degree equations, worked as 
a teacher of mathematics in Venice; in what was likely a bid for patronage, he 
dedicated to the duke of Urbino, Francesco Maria della Rovere, a study of ballistics 
in which he determined the angle at which a cannon should be pointed to maximize 
its range.85  Or Bernard Palissy (1510-90), a potter employed by the French Queen 
Catherine de Medici, articulated his pride in his artisanal knowledge of the 
interactions of water and clay in a vernacular dialogue in which empirically-minded 
“pratique” consistently mocked and defeated the learned pretensions of 
“theorique.”86 Authors in these new modes of natural philosophical inquiry worked 
 28 
independently of and often with hostility to the universities.  Nonetheless a few 
innovations developed outside the universities were selectively incorporated into 
university teaching. 
 Certainly one of the great challenges to Aristotelian natural philosophy 
stemmed from the accumulation of theoretical and observational innovations in 
astronomy.  Copernicanism was discussed but almost universally dismissed in 
universities prior to 1640; the principal exception was a circle of scholars associated 
with the University of Wittenberg who were willing to entertain Copernicanism as a 
useful hypothesis in the 1560s and 1570s.87  From the early seventeenth century on, 
however, the theory was gradually given more careful consideration.88  At Paris and 
other Catholic institutions, the Tychonic system was generally preferred until the 
acceptance of Cartesianism (in the 1690s at the University of Paris) or 
Newtonianism (e.g., in the liberalized climate in Rome in the 1740s).  The papal ban 
on works expounding heliocentrism was finally lifted in 1757.89  Although immune 
to the papal condemnation of Galileo (1633), Protestants too raised objections to 
Copernicus on physical and biblical grounds.  For example, Christian Wurstisen 
(1544-88) was forbidden from teaching Copernicanism at the University of Basel 
after he had begun to do so while he taught mathematics there from 1564 to 1586.90 
 For Protestants and Catholics alike, to accept heliocentrism required 
jettisoning many fundamental tenets of Aristotelian physics and opening oneself to 
considerable religious objections.  In particular, Aristotelian physics dictated that the 
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earth, as the heaviest of the elements, naturally rested at the center of the universe, 
whereas only the celestial bodies made of the perfect fifth element could revolve in 
eternal circular motion.  Biblical passages like Joshua 10:12, in which Joshua asked 
the sun to “stand still over Gibeon” to give him more time to finish a battle, seemed 
a powerful objection to many—from Catholics like Cardinal Bellarmine, who saw in 
Galileo’s arguments no grounds for replacing the traditional interpretation of the 
Church fathers, to Protestants like Tycho Brahe, who felt that such Biblical 
statements about philosophy should be acknowledged as authoritative and 
unambiguous.91 
 There were nonetheless innovations in astronomy less radical than 
heliocentrism itself to which Aristotelian natural philosophy proved more 
permeable. These included the discovery by Tycho Brahe, from his well-equipped 
observatory on the Danish island of Hven, that there was no observable parallax for 
the comet of 1577.  Brahe concluded that the comet had appeared in the highest 
regions of the heavens, above the sphere of the moon.  Like the new star of 1572, 
which he had already described, the comet therefore constituted an example of 
change in the part of the heavens that was immutable according to Aristotelian 
cosmology.  Reaction among natural philosophers to this specific challenge to 
Aristotelian theory of the heavens was varied.  At the University of Paris, for 
example, one professor rejected Brahe’s parallax measurement (although it certainly 
was the best available); another discussed comets and the arguments for and against 
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their superlunary nature without concluding one way or the other; another allowed 
that there were two kinds of comets—some were sublunary, as Aristotle described, 
and others superlunary, like that observed by Brahe, and of supernatural origin; 
another still simply abandoned the traditional sub- and super-lunary distinction in 
favor of a fluid heaven, following Brahe and the Stoics.92  [see DONAHUE]  In 
these various ways these Aristotelian natural philosophers absorbed the observation 
into their philosophical scheme without any threat to their Aristotelian allegiance.  
The same was true of the sunspots and the irregularities of the moon observed 
through the telescope by Galileo, which also violated the Aristotelian principle of the 
immutability of the superlunary world.93  Thus a number of Aristotelian natural 
philosophers were aware of and willing to accept some recent astronomical 
innovations. 
 The Renaissance also witnessed an explosion of natural historical knowledge 
prompted by voyages to the New World and by an increased documentation of the 
flora and fauna of regions both exotic and familiar.  Although Aristotle himself was 
a keen observer of natural particulars and composed a number of natural historical 
works, natural history did not get much attention in the standard cursus of 
Aristotelian natural philosophy. It was rather the purview of medical doctors, 
seeking to catalogue remedies in mineral, vegetable, and animal substances.  One 
university professor of philosophy explained in the early seventeenth century that 
natural history was rarely taught because its topics were not demonstrative nor 
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difficult enough to require a teacher and because there was not enough time to fit 
them into the philosophy curriculum.94 Textbooks of natural philosophy generally 
simply enumerated the large categories of natural history (birds, quadrupeds, fish, 
snakes, and insects, for example) without paying any attention to the particular 
features of each species that would detract from the universal quality of the scientia 
of natural philosophy.95 Authors working outside the universities, free from the time 
constraints of a set curriculum and generally more open to a broader range of recent 
work in natural history or travel accounts, often devoted more attention to natural 
particulars, as in Girolamo Cardano's De subtilitate rerum (On the subtlety of 
Things, 1550) and De rerum varietate (On the Variety of Things, 1557) or Jean 
Bodin's Universae naturae theatrum (Theater of universal Nature, 1596). 
 Nonetheless, observations from the New World and other places entered 
Aristotelian natural philosophy at the universities in various ways. [See FINDLEN, 
“Natural History,” and VOGEL, “Cosmography”],   For example, all commentators 
acknowledged that recent experience had disproved the ancient notion that the torrid 
zone was uninhabitable.  The Jesuit commentators at the University of Coimbra in 
Portugal (active 1592-98), for example, debated in their frequently reprinted 
commentaries on Aristotle the number of continents, the proportion of sea and land, 
and adduced a mix of ancient, medieval and modern authors, explicitly noting the 
priority of experience over received authority on these issues.96  The Jesuits were 
also well known for their courses on geography, which integrated the reports of 
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faraway missionaries, and tutored the future ruling elites of different nations in local 
geography and hydrography—hardly Aristotelian topics.97 Perhaps in conscious 
emulation of the Jesuits, perhaps in response to the interests of their students, who 
were also destined to be officers of the new bureaucracies, university professors 
could also include natural historical and geographical topics ranging well beyond the 
prescribed Aristotelian texts.  For example, student notes extant in manuscript and 
published form show how one professor at Paris in the 1620s, Jean-Cecile Frey, 
discussed the New World in a physics course of 1618 after offering more standard 
commentaries on On the Heavens and On Generation and Corruption.  Professors 
could also introduce a broad range of topics in extracurricular instruction, which was 
especially common in the residential colleges of Oxford or Paris.  This was the most 
likely locus for Frey’s more unusual courses—on druidic philosophy and the 
“admirable things of the Gauls” (covering the noteworthy natural and human 
features of contemporary France) or on “curious propositions about the universe,” 
which contained a motley selection of travel lore.98 
 The Jesuits were particularly noted among Aristotelian natural philosophers 
for their openness to new empirical and mathematical methods.  Although they did 
not practice experiments or the observation of specific, punctual events, the Jesuits 
are credited with incorporating the evidence of common experience in theorizing 
about natural philosophy.99  The Jesuits harbored magneticians like Niccolò Cabeo 
(1586-1650) and Athanasius Kircher (1602-80), who adopted the experimentalism 
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of William Gilbert (1544-1603), although the Society formally banned some of 
Gilbert's propositions in 1651.100  At the Collegio Romano especially, which trained 
the elite of the Jesuit intellectuals, professors like Christoph Clavius (1537-1612) 
kept abreast of new developments in the mathematization of physical phenomena 
like motion, which seemed an impossible crossing of disciplinary boundaries to 
most traditional Aristotelians.101 [See BENNETT, BERTOLONI MELI] 
Throughout the seventeenth century, the Jesuits included prominent astronomers 
noted for their observational feats despite their continued allegiance to Aristotle and 
the Tychonic system.102 
 Even at the universities there was some penetration of the new methods.  
Starting in the late sixteenth century, universities throughout Europe increasingly 
featured botanical gardens and anatomy theaters, generally associated with the 
medical faculties, and (in the seventeenth century) observatories and chemical 
laboratories.103  At Oxford and Cambridge, chairs were established in the 
mathematical disciplines: the Savilian chairs of geometry and astronomy were 
founded at Oxford in 1619 and 1621 and the Lucasian chair of mathematics at 
Cambridge in 1663.104  Students' notebooks and book ownership records provide 
evidence of both formal and informal instruction in geography at Oxford and 
Cambridge.105  Students could also engage in extracurricular scientific activities in 
the laboratories that friends or tutors kept in their rooms.106  Although many a new 
philosopher complained that his years of study were wasted,107 instruction in early 
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modern universities could be quite wide-ranging and could integrate new elements 
of theory and practice.  Official curricula, like most university statutes or the Jesuit 
ratio studiorum, generally mentioned only Aristotelian works and in some cases 
called explicitly for allegiance to them.108  But official curricula do not give us a full 
picture of the teaching to which a student was actually exposed.  Professorial 
treatises and student notes and commonplace books, many more of which deserve to 
be studied, reveal the diversity of topics that students encountered, from the private 
laboratories in some college rooms in Cambridge to the druids in Frey's 
extracurricular Paris instruction or the Presocratics praised in the teaching of one 
Paduan professor in the 1640s.109  Nonetheless, exposure to new methods and topics 
remained an optional extra and never took on the dominant or obligatory character 
of the more traditional parts of the curriculum. 
 
Resistance to Radical Innovation 
 
Given the diversity of opinion it embraced, early modern Aristotelian natural 
philosophy cannot easily be defined as a set of philosophical positions.110  One 
scholar has concluded that, “probably not one of Aristotle’s doctrines was held by all 
early modern scholastics.”111  Certainly most Aristotelian philosophers adhered to a 
set of core beliefs.  The three principles of form, matter, and privation constitute the 
bedrock of Aristotle’s theory of substance and change (called hylemorphism, from 
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hyle, matter and morphe, form). [See JOY] Matter is passive, but has the potential to 
become a substance when it is informed by a substantial form; form is the active 
principle that gives qualities to the substance and experiences change.  Privation, or 
the absence of form, is necessary to explain the state of matter before it becomes 
substance, but its importance to late Aristotelians was on the wane.112 
 Most famously, Aristotelians adhered to the notion that the sublunary world 
consisted of four elements—air, earth, water, and fire; but late Aristotelians did not 
hold unanimously even this central tenet.  For example, one Théophraste Bouju, 
royal counselor and almoner, who claimed for his vernacular coverage of 
quadripartite philosophy in 1614 the authority of Aristotle, nonetheless rejected fire 
as an element.113  This was also the position of the Italian physician Girolamo 
Cardano, who in his mid-sixteenth-century works of philosophy and medicine 
prided himself on rejecting the received authorities, respectively Aristotle and 
Galen.114  The main difference between the two resides not in their actual position 
rejecting fire as an element but in the way in which they couched it: whereas Bouju 
proclaimed himself an Aristotelian, Cardano thought of himself and was thought of 
by contemporaries as an anti-Aristotelian innovator (“novator”)—a term freighted, 
unlike today, with mostly negative connotations.  Given the doctrinal flexibility of 
“Aristotelianism,” self-definition was a key factor to consider in distinguishing an 
eclectic Aristotelian from a critic of Aristotle, since both might share some of the 
same positions despite being in opposing camps.115 
 36 
 Although Aristotelian natural philosophers in the early modern period 
boasted of novelties of their own and took liberties with received Aristotelian 
philosophy, they bristled at explicit attacks against Aristotle.  From Theophrastus 
Bombastus von Hohenheim, or Paracelsus (1493-1541), who called for bonfires of 
authoritative texts at the University of Basel in 1527, to the three young philosophers 
at the University of Paris who advertised in 1624 a public defense of 14 atomist 
theses “against Aristotle, Paracelsus, and the Cabbalists,” those who publicly 
attacked Aristotle were rapidly condemned.  Paracelsus was drummed out of Basel 
and the 1624 disputation, forbidden by the Sorbonne in a ban enforced by the 
Parlement of Paris, never took place.116  In both cases the attacks on Aristotle were 
perceived to threaten the stability of the institutional university hierarchy and by 
extension of society itself.  The three young philosophers provoked such a reaction 
at a time when in less formal, private venues similar challenges to Aristotle were 
probably being discussed, because they were perceived not as disinterested seekers 
after truth, but rather as arrogant troublemakers, intentionally attracting large crowds 
to hear their scandalous attacks on their elders' orthodox doctrines.  University and 
civil authorities cracked down hard, particularly since the bloody consequences of 
doctrinal disputes during the recent wars of religion (1562-98) were still vividly 
remembered.117 
 Explicit anti-Aristotelianism, especially when it threatened to strike within 
the university, triggered reiterations of the commitment to Aristotle that one finds in 
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official documents.118  University professors were not the only ones to defend 
Aristotle when a wave of anti-Aristotelian works appeared in the 1620s.  The Minim 
Marin Mersenne (1588-1648), who maintained a large international network of 
correspondents and both convened and attended the kinds of informal gatherings that 
were especially interested in new philosophies, nonetheless judged quite harshly 
those who wrote against Aristotle: 
 
 [Aristotle] transcends all that is sensible and imaginable, and the others crawl 
on the earth like little worms: Aristotle is an Eagle in Philosophy, the others 
are only like chicks who want to fly before having wings.119 
 
Late Aristotelian natural philosophers may have become increasingly eclectic in the 
positions they embraced and thought of themselves more as independent 
philosophers than as commentators of the Philosopher, but they also became 
increasingly strident in their explicit allegiance to and defense of Aristotle against 
detractors.  This explicit allegiance was what they had most unambiguously in 
common. 
 Despite a certain presence of new empirical and mathematical methods at the 
universities, Aristotelian natural philosophers could not accept the call to reject 
received philosophy and ancient authorities as mere opinion and to build certain 
knowledge instead on mathematical and empirical foundations.  Aristotelian natural 
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philosophy was defined as the search for scientia or certain knowledge, to be 
acquired through deductive causal explanation rather than empirical or mathematical 
description; the new philosophies of the seventeenth century would share this goal of 
causal explanation, but proposed very different methods from the bookish cycle of 
philosophical discussion practiced by the Aristotelians.  The philosophies of the 
sixteenth century, by contrast, which relied on replacing Aristotle with an alternative 
ancient philosopher as their champion (e.g., Plato, Epicurus, or the Stoics) by and 
large perpetuated the methods of Aristotelian natural philosophy.  These traditional 
natural philosophies were overwhelmingly bookish in their sources, drawing their 
explananda from authoritative texts rather than from observations of nature or 
experiments.  Their explanations relied on dialectical argumentation rather than 
mathematical demonstration; and their motives were entirely speculative, with no 
concern for the possibility of practical applications.  By contrast, the mechanical 
philosophers, who prevailed by the end of the seventeenth century and called for 
experiments to acquire data or confirm theory, strove for mathematical laws as the 
ideal expression of natural phenomena and promised (albeit often on the thinnest of 
grounds) practical applications for the future.  [see DEAR]  After successfully 
weathering the threat of alternative traditional natural philosophies through the mid-
seventeenth century, and issuing strident condemnations of the mechanical 
philosophers as late as the 1670s, Aristotelianism finally succumbed first to 
mechanical philosophy, and then to Newtonianism. 
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 The mechanical philosophy was flexible enough to embrace both 
experimentation and mathematization and a radical enough departure from 
Aristotelianism that attempts to reconcile the two (in philosophies dubbed “nov-
antiqua”) did not have broad success.  Cartesianism first entered the French 
universities, one of the last major bastions of Aristotelianism, in the 1690s, although 
near Barcelona students were still producing under dictation courses in the old style, 
commenting on the Physics and the On the Heavens through the eighteenth 
century.120  After 1668 no new Latin editions of the works of Aristotle were issued 
until the activities of classical scholars in the nineteenth century.121 
 
Forces for Change in the Seventeenth Century 
 
While the Aristotelians controlled the universities, the “new philosophers” relied on 
new kinds of institutions to develop their ideas and gain a following.  These more or 
less formal gatherings ranged from “academies” with princely patronage to informal 
meetings in individual homes.  Often formed on the model of literary societies, the 
groups that focused on scientific questions operated in the vernacular.  The first may 
well have been the group of curiosi that Giambattista della Porta (1535-1615) 
gathered around him in Naples in the 1560s as the Accademia dei Secreti; 
membership was reserved for those who could contribute a new observation.  The 
Roman Accademia dei Lincei, founded by the nobleman Federico Cesi in 1603, 
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famous for including Galileo among its members, and the Florentine Accademia del 
Cimento, founded in 1657, were both especially oriented toward the collection of 
observations and the performance of experiments.122 
 In the Holy Roman Empire scientific societies appeared later, starting in the 
mid-seventeenth century, and focused especially on attempts to form a pansophic 
philosophy to counteract the religious and political splintering of the Empire as 
consolidated by the Thirty Years War.  The short-lived Societas Ereunetica, the 
Academia Naturae Curiosorum founded in Schweinfurt in 1652 (reorganized in 
1677 as the Academia Leopoldina under the auspices of the Emperor but with no 
fixed location), and the Collegium Experimentale founded in Altdorf in the 1670s 
respectively promoted rosicrucianism, alchemy, and the study of mirabilia; these 
emphases accentuated the growing cultural divergence between Eastern and Western 
Europe.123  More successful in gaining a European-wide audience were the Acta 
eruditorum, a learned journal founded in Leipzig in 1682 and the plan for a 
“Societas scientiarum” conceived by Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz (1646-1716) among 
many other projects for implementing his utopian visions of international scientific 
and philosophical collaboration.  The plan called for a society under the patronage of 
the elector of Brandenburg comprised of members based in Berlin and 
correspondents reporting from elsewhere, divided into departments of physics, 
mathematics, German languages, and literatures.  Although the plan was adopted in 
1700 with Leibniz as the Society’s president, the Berliner Sozietät der 
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Wissenschaften was inaugurated only in 1711 due to difficulties in securing 
sufficient revenues.124 In England and France a series of informal gatherings starting 
in the 1630s culminated in the foundation of the Royal Society in 1662 and the 
Académie Royale des Sciences in 1666, which both emphasized the utilitarian goals 
of science following the ideals of Francis Bacon.125 
 Amid these various gatherings of the early seventeenth century, the 
multiplication of attacks on Aristotle and the sense that skepticism was a dangerous 
threat to be countered created an atmosphere in which it seemed that anyone could 
offer a “new philosophy.” For example, the Bureau d’Adresse of Théophraste 
Renaudot held weekly discussions on philosophy from 1633 to 1642, in which the 
public was invited to participate according to rules that called for reasoned and 
amiable interchange on any philosophical topic excluding politics and religion.126  
Judging from the printed record of these sessions (in which the participants remain 
anonymous), a wide range of questions were debated, in French, around Aristotle 
and the new philosophies: from traditional questions about the origins of motion, 
vapors or thunder, or whether one can demonstrate the immortality of the soul, to 
questions of more recent origin concerning the merits of such novelties as 
heliocentrism, and the mechanical and chemical philosophies.  Richelieu, whose 
support made the existence of the Bureau possible, may well have initiated 
discussion of practical questions about navigation and how to determine 
longitude.127  At a more select and less formal venue in Paris, a lecture at the home 
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of the papal nuncio in Paris in 1628, where one Sieur de Chandoux was touting his 
philosophical system, Descartes rose to refute him and impressed Cardinal Bérulle, 
who then enjoined Descartes to carry on the search for a new philosophy.128  
Descartes’ brief from this leading figure of the French Counter-Reformation was to 
combat skepticism by devising a new philosophy that would be both certain, to 
counter the skeptics, and pious, to counter the impieties proposed in place of 
Aristotle. 
 
The Origins of the Mechanical Philosophy 
 
In the 1620s a European-wide spate of anti-Aristotelian works appeared, notably by 
the Frenchman Sebastian Basso (fl. c. 1560-1621), the French Oratorian Pierre 
Gassendi (1592-1655), the Dutchman David van Goorl (b. 1591), and the 
Englishman Nicholas Hill (c. 1570-1610), all of them atomists.129  Rather than a 
single philosophy, atomism designates loosely a number of different theories 
premised on the idea that matter is constituted of the coalescence of indivisible 
atoms.130  Some atomists, like Daniel Sennert (1572-1637) professor at the 
University of Wittenberg, were keen to derive the notion from Aristotle and to do so 
relied on passages in Averroes’ commentary which discussed the existence of 
smallest units of a substance or “minima naturalia”;131 this was the kind of atomism 
most often found in university contexts.132  Others couched their theories as 
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refutations of Aristotelian physics, grounded in an alchemical notion of “seeds” of 
matter (Paracelsus, Michael Sendivogius, and Johannes Baptista van Helmont) or in 
Epicureanism.133 
 Gassendi proposed a full-scale revival of Epicureanism, an ancient 
philosophy long reviled as irreligious because of its explanations based on the 
chance encounters of atoms.  To make Epicureanism compatible with Christianity 
(and even more “pious” than Aristotelianism, he claimed), Gassendi rejected the 
Epicurean notion of eternal uncreated atoms.  Instead, Gassendi maintained that 
atoms were divinely created and endowed with motion by God, and he introduced 
into the strictly naturalistic system of Epicurus immaterial beings, including angels 
and rational souls, which did not jeopardize the atomic structure of material ones.134 
  Gassendi directed his system against the Aristotelians, but by mid-century it 
became clear that the main opposition to Aristotelianism would come from another 
innovator, René Descartes (1596-1650).  Whereas Gassendi’s works were never 
translated from Latin, Descartes’ theories were more broadly popularized, notably in 
French.135 Furthermore Descartes’ followers proved skilled at adapting his original 
philosophy in response to objections, easing its spread into the universities.136 
 Descartes’ philosophy can be seen as a kind of atomism, although Descartes 
differed from Gassendi on infinite divisibility, which Gassendi denied, and on the 
existence of the void, which Descartes denied.  In the Discours de la méthode 
(Discourse on method) of 1637, Descartes described how through systematic doubt 
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he eliminated all previous philosophical commitments as mere opinion and started 
from scratch to build a solid philosophy based only on “clear and distinct” ideas.137  
From the existence of the thinking self (cogito ergo sum) Descartes established the 
existence of God, guarantor of the truth of the clear and distinct ideas, and, by 
further rational deduction, the building blocks of an entire cosmology.  From the 
basic principles that matter is extension, that all phenomena can be explained as 
matter in motion, and that secondary qualities can be reduced to the primary 
qualities of size, shape, and motion, Descartes envisioned the world as a plenum of 
particles of matter of various sizes set in motion by God and self-perpetuating since 
then.  The interaction of the particles according to various rules of impact had 
generated all natural phenomena—from the planets and their movement in circular 
vortices to the sensations of taste or smell in the body.  Descartes’ philosophy was 
designed as a complete overhaul of existing philosophies, Aristotelian and atomist.  
Because of his commitment to heliocentrism, he feared that his work would be 
placed on the index following the condemnation of Galileo in 1633, and as a result 
he left his cosmological treatise Le monde (The world) unpublished during his 
lifetime. 
 It is not easy to explain the success of Cartesianism.138  Like other new 
theories, it caught the fancy of the young especially, among whom it generated 
unusual enthusiasm.  Christiaan Huygens (1629-95), for example, described with 
some bemusement in later years how he was enthralled, at the age of 15 or 16, by the 
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novel and pleasing aspect of the vortices of particles that constituted Descartes' 
cosmology.139  The enthusiastic support of the younger and more reckless of 
contemporary philosophers certainly did not enhance the appeal of Cartesianism to 
the rest of the philosophical community.  At the recently founded University of 
Utrecht, the bold teachings of Henricus Regius (1589-1679), which were never 
condoned by Descartes, prompted an official condemnation of Cartesianism in 
1641.140  Professors at Utrecht were forbidden from teaching Cartesianism on the 
grounds that it undermined the foundations of traditional philosophy and the 
acquisition of the technical terms commonly used by traditional authors, and because 
“various false and absurd opinions either follow from the new philosophy or can 
rashly be deduced by the young.”141 Although Cartesianism was banned in Leiden, 
too, the Low Countries also harbored some of the earliest university interest in 
Descartes, notably at the new institution of Groningen.142 
 In France Cartesianism was condemned by the king and the university (in 
1671) after Cartesian attempts to account for the Eucharistic transformation had 
been condemned by the pope in 1663.143  But outside the universities Cartesianism 
inspired the friendly critique of the Jansenist Antoine Arnauld (1612-94), which 
marked the beginning of the association many contemporaries saw between 
Cartesianism and Jansenism, an oppositional religious and political faction.144  
Descartes also inspired the occasionalism of the Oratorian Nicolas Malebranche 
(1638-1715), and, most effectively, the popularization efforts of Jacques Rohault 
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(1618-72).  Rohault gave weekly public lectures in Paris expounding Descartes' 
physics, which even included experiments.  His Traité de physique (1671) became 
the standard textbook of Cartesian physics and was used, in Latin then English 
translation, across the Continent as well as at Oxford and Cambridge.145  Rohault’s 
success, like that of Robert Chouet, who introduced Cartesian physics at the 
Academy of Geneva in 1669 without provoking controversy, rested on the strategy 
of minimizing the differences between Cartesianism and Aristotelian natural 
philosophy.146 
 The eclecticism of Cartesians willing to compromise on the points that most 
irked Aristotelians (among them Descartes’ rejection of hylemorphism, his 
heliocentric cosmology and his mechanistic interpretation of animals) certainly 
contributed to their success.  For examples, Cartesians lecturing at the university 
were often willing to put their views in an Aristotelian framework, by organizing 
their discussions under such scholastic headings as “matter” and “form”; some even 
tried to read Cartesian views into Aristotle, claiming that earlier commentators had 
misunderstood him.147  They also avoided claiming heliocentrism as an 
unimpeachable fact and proposed it merely as a hypothesis; dropping Descartes’ 
metaphysical underpinnings of his physics, they limited Descartes’ physics of matter 
in motion to the inorganic world, thereby skirting the delicate question of sentient 
beings.148  Furthermore, a strong institutional separation between philosophy and 
theology, such as existed in Geneva, enabled Cartesian physics to be adopted 
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without provoking fears of irreligious consequences.  In Germany, where there was 
little tradition of a separation of philosophy and theology, Cartesianism was slow to 
spread, despite the inroads made by Johann Clauberg (1622-65) in Duisburg.149  In 
Italy, Cartesianism appeared as part of a “mechanist syncretism” starting in Naples 
in the 1660s.150 
 Although Colbert rejected Cartesians as members in the early Académie 
Royale des Sciences on the grounds that they were excessively dogmatic, after his 
death in 1683 the Académie became more closely associated with Cartesianism, 
even more so after Malebranche and Bernard le Bovier de Fontenelle (1657-1757) 
became members in 1699 (and the latter, secretary of the Académie).  The 
University of Paris followed suit, and Cartesianism became the norm there in the 
1690s.  The Jesuits, forbidden from teaching the new philosophy, soon found 
themselves a laughing stock and their classes deserted in the early eighteenth 
century.151  Ironically, Aristotelianism yielded to Cartesianism in France just at the 
time that Descartes’ cosmology had been debunked by the work of Huygens and 
Newton; but the French natural philosophers, loath to abandon their national 
champion, only cast off Descartes for Newton some fifty years later, in the 1740s.152 
 
The Transformation of Natural Philosophy by Empirical and Mathematical Methods 
 
In England the spread of the mechanical philosophy was enhanced by contact with 
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the philosophies of Gassendi and Descartes, not only through print, but also through 
the travel to France of émigrés during the civil war of the 1640s.  Thomas Hobbes 
and William Cavendish, for example, returned to England enthusiastic about 
mechanical philosophy.153  Although Hobbes (1588-1679) favored the rationalist 
methods of Descartes, most English mechanical philosophers grafted onto the basic 
principles of matter-in-motion, practices of observation and experimentation 
inspired by Francis Bacon.154  Bacon developed no philosophical system to replace 
Aristotle’s and was never successful in his lifetime in gaining the support he sought 
for a reform of society through a reform of natural philosophy.155  Nonetheless after 
his death in 1626 (fittingly, so the contemporary story went, from pneumonia 
contracted while observing a chicken frozen in winter156), his work inspired natural 
philosophers, especially in England but also on the continent, well into the 
eighteenth century.  Bacon called for a collaborative pursuit of natural knowledge 
through the systematic observation of nature, both in its natural state and “on the 
rack,” that is, in artificial experiments contrived to highlight otherwise hidden 
features.  In his Novum Organum (New Organon, 1620) designed to replace the 
logical Organon of Aristotle, Bacon described a method for the careful derivation of 
generalizations from the accumulation of natural historical particulars.157 
 English mechanical philosophers like Robert Boyle (1627-91) and Robert 
Hooke (1635-1703) adhered to the principle that everything could be explained by 
matter in motion.  But they shunned what they perceived to be the dogmatism of 
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Descartes, with his a priori rationalist assumptions, for example his denial of the 
possibility of a void.  Instead they favored a new experimental method, which 
differed from the concept of “experience” current among both eclectic Aristotelians 
and the new philosophers of the Continent (including Galileo, Descartes, and Blaise 
Pascal [1623-62]).  Rather than invoking “experience” unproblematically as what 
was commonly known to happen in nature and using it as a quick justification to 
arrive at general principles, the English experimentalists described with precision 
specific events that actually happened in nature, produced by experimental 
conditions designed to elicit unusual phenomena (such as the air pump), and they 
were cautious about offering causal explanations of the observed phenomena.158  
Rejecting explanations that attributed moral qualities to nature (like the “fear of the 
void” associated with Aristotle), Boyle introduced qualities that he attributed to the 
particles of matter, such as the springiness of air particles (later interpreted as the 
discovery of “Boyle’s law”), although he could not explain springiness itself in 
terms of the shape and size of the particles.159  Boyle remained mindful of the limits 
of human ability to understand all the reasons of nature and was satisfied, like most 
English experimentalists, with what he considered to be probable rather than certain 
knowledge resulting from the experimental investigations.160 
 In a parallel, more mathematical tradition, continental natural philosophers 
like Galileo and his followers pursued mathematics as the key to certainty in natural 
philosophy.  Although Galileo probably did perform inclined plane experiments, he 
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often idealized “experience” as what would happen in nature under perfect 
conditions (e.g., in free fall without air resistance).161  The new physics of motion 
expressed in mathematical laws that he developed inspired the modifications by 
Christian Huygens and was a prerequisite to Newton’s synthesis of the new physics 
with the new astronomy.162  It also marked the end of the traditional distinction 
between physics as the science of real bodies and mathematics as the study of 
abstract and unreal entities. This separation had already been eroded in some circles 
by the study of “mixed mathematical” disciplines such as optics or astronomy, but it 
appealed especially to natural philosophers who felt that their discipline was superior 
to mathematics.  In a separate strand of mathematization, Kepler had discovered 
three laws of mathematical correlations in the planetary motions; his method was 
grounded in the conviction that God had created the universe according to “number, 
weight and measure” and therefore according to mathematical laws, and in the 
painstaking attention to empirical precision with which he manipulated the data 
collected by Tycho Brahe.163 
 Both Galileo and Kepler carried out much of their innovative mathematical 
and observational work under the auspices of princely patronage.  They began their 
careers teaching mathematics at the university or equivalent institutions, Galileo first 
at Pisa then at Padua from 1592 to 1610 and Kepler at the Protestant seminary in 
Graz from 1594 to 1600.  In 1600 Kepler began as Tycho Brahe’s assistant at the 
court of the Holy Roman Emperor Rudolf II in Prague and became Imperial 
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Mathematician upon Tycho’s death in 1601.164  In 1610 Galileo was named court 
mathematician to Cosimo II de Medici, Grand Duke of Tuscany in Florence.165  In 
moving to positions at court they were freed from the constraints of often low-paid 
teaching and of the traditional notions of what should be taught.  Both worked to 
support heliocentrism at a time when Copernicus’ theory was considered by others 
as at best a useful computational tool; they challenged the traditional distinctions and 
hierarchy between the disciplines in using mathematics to address physical questions 
about the nature of motion or the cosmos.166  Similarly, those who contributed most 
to the development of mechanical philosophy relied mostly on new institutions such 
as the Royal Society.  Though he settled in Oxford in 1656, Robert Boyle was an 
independently wealthy gentleman with no connection to the University.  Isaac 
Newton held the Lucasian professorship of mathematics from 1669 to 1701, but 
even before he left Cambridge in 1696 for an appointment as warden of the Mint in 
London, his teaching elicited almost no notice from students or contemporaries.167  
Instead, Newton sent his first major piece of work, the reflecting telescope, to the 
Royal Society in 1671; he was elected a fellow in 1672 and then President of the 
Royal Society in 1703.  Despite contentious relations with various fellows, most 
notably the curator of experiments Robert Hooke (1635-1703), the Royal Society 
constituted his primary scientific audience. 
 Newton puzzled many contemporaries by offering mathematical laws but no 
causal explanations in his Principia mathematica philosophiae naturalis  
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(Mathematical Principles of Natural Philosophy, 1687); he counted on the certainty 
of mathematics to forestall the disputatiousness that he so disliked among natural 
philosophers.  But this strategy nonetheless embroiled him in controversy: Leibniz, 
among others, accused him of reintroducing “occult qualities,” [See 
COPENHAVER] because, although his theory of gravitation provided a single 
powerful explanation for the tides, the motions of the moon and the planets as well 
as projectile motion, Newton gave no causal account for gravitation itself, 
concluding, in his “General scholium”: 
 
 I frame no hypothesis; for whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to 
be called an hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, 
whether of occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental 
philosophy.168 
 
Newton moderated this stance somewhat in editions of his Opticks after the addition 
in 1706 of queries 25-31 containing speculations about the nature of light and of 
attraction, among other topics. 
 In addition to his publications on mathematical and physical subjects 
Newton remained concerned with a full range of traditional topics, as is evident from 
his abundant theological and alchemical writings left in manuscript.169  Although he 
definitively transformed physics into its modern form as a technical mathematical 
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discipline, Newton has been described as the last of the Renaissance natural 
philosophers. His diverse interests were all part of a quest to understand the 
workings of God in the world—for example, in nature through the motions of the 
planets that God regulates and sustains, and in history through the fulfillment of 
biblical prophecies.170  One of the ways in which early modern natural philosophy 
differs from the various “sciences” that later replaced it is that natural philosophy 
was unified by its search for a better understanding of God—of divine creation (in 
natural historical disciplines) and divine laws (in the mathematized disciplines).171 
 
The Social Conventions of the New Natural Philosophy 
 
By the late seventeenth century the Royal Society of London and the Paris 
Académie Royale des Sciences played leading roles in defining the practices of 
natural philosophy that were increasingly imitated throughout Europe and in 
reforming the universities.  The Baconian ideal influenced both institutions, as they 
pursued in different ways a collaborative model of natural philosophy with 
utilitarian ambitions.172  For lack of the royal patronage it had hoped for, the Royal 
Society was financed by its members, who paid an annual subscription and actively 
recruited the eminent to enhance its standing.  Far-flung members who never 
attended meetings could contribute observations by correspondence, but the day-to-
day activities of the Society were dominated by a core group of less than twenty 
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fellows.173  The Académie Royale des Sciences was more tightly hierarchized (into 
honoraires, pensionnaires, associés, and élèves) and at its core comprised an élite of 
twenty-two members selected first by Colbert, later by the members in session; they 
received an annual stipend as officers of the king and performed various specific 
tasks, such as the administration of patents and prizes.174  Despite these different 
formats, both institutions hoped to mobilize natural philosophers to undertake 
collective natural histories, to promote the material welfare of society. 
 The Académie was assigned by Colbert the task of drawing up an inventory 
of machines in the country and although they collected models of machines and 
volumes of careful illustrations, the project was never completed.  It then undertook 
a vast history of plants, instigated by Claude Perrault (1613-88) and directed by 
various members in turn; but, although some results were published, the project was 
never realized according to the initial ambitions due to lack of funding and personal 
rivalries as well as intellectual disagreements, notably concerning the appropriate 
balance between description and illustration on the one hand and causal explanation 
and chemical analysis on the other.175  The sessions were closed, but the proceedings 
were published in the Mémoires.  At the Royal Society an active core of members 
attended and discussed the results of experiments performed by the curator of 
instruments.  Without a specific agenda, the collaborative accumulation of results 
was realized in the wide range of material covered in the Philosophical Transactions; 
these developed a distinctive rhetoric to describe experiments to the members who 
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could not attend and enlist their support as “virtual witnesses” to the phenomena.176  
The model of the natural philosopher as a gentleman, as epitomized for example by 
Robert Boyle, emphasized civility of conversation over passionate debate as the 
ideal form of interaction and encouraged members of the Royal Society to present 
their findings as modest observations of fact with only cautious references to 
theoretical claims.177 
 Both groups explicitly banned religious and political discussions and 
dogmatism of any kind (Jesuits and Cartesians were both banned from the Académie 
by Colbert for that reason).  The Royal Society and the Académie Royale des 
Sciences conferred on natural philosophy a new institutional and intellectual 
autonomy.  In these settings the review and agreement of respected peers constituted 
the criterion of acceptability instead of adherence to pre-established conclusions set 
by church or state.178  Furthermore, the disputatiousness for which traditional natural 
philosophy had become notorious was considered a vice best avoided in the new 
environment of the academies.  Although results fell short of expectations and 
perhaps the first functionally useful item to stem from the Baconian research 
program was Benjamin Franklin’s lightning rod (1750), both the Royal Society and 
the Académie Royale des Sciences successfully propagated the idea that science 
could be useful to state and society.179 
 
Conclusion 
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The evolution of natural philosophy between 1500 and 1700 can be traced in a 
nutshell in encyclopedic reference works.  Gregor Reisch’s Margarita philosophica 
(1503), two short books on the principles and on the origins of natural things, 
summarized Aristotle's Physics and sketched his Meteorology and natural histories 
(with additional material drawn from Pliny).  Natural philosophy appeared as a 
largely static field covered by ancient authorities.  A century later the Encyclopedia 
(1630) of Johann Heinrich Alsted (1588-1638) crystallized many of the 
developments of the Renaissance.  The eight parts in which physics was divided 
featured Aristotelian notions (principles, elements, meteorological theories), 
enhanced with new, often modern, even anti-Aristotelian, authorities.  Alsted coined 
new terms and lent credence to new subfields—among them most were traditional 
topics (mictologia, phythologia, empsychologia, therologia180) but they also included 
“physiognomia,” which incorporated Paracelsian signatures and Neoplatonic 
correspondences.  Each part concluded with a peroration vaunting the contribution 
of that field to piety and the greater glory of God.  Aristotle still set the framework 
for physics, but new authorities, a new conception of independent philosophizing, 
and a renewed concern for religious piety motivated a work of synthesis that was so 
eclectic and inclusive as to verge on incoherence.181  If Aristotelianism had always 
been a loose baggy monster, this was the monster at its loosest and baggiest. 
 Less than a century after Alsted, John Harris’ Lexicon technicum (1708-10) 
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still used the same terms and elements of definition: “Physicks or natural philosophy 
is the speculative knowledge of all natural bodies ... and of their proper natures, 
constitutions, powers and operations.”  But the means of achieving the 
understanding of nature bore no relation to Aristotle’s physics.  Instead electricity, 
effluvia, elasticity, magnetism, and light were the recurring themes; the authorities 
cited centered around Newton, Edmund Halley, Nehemiah Grew, and Boyle.  
Traditional philosophies had not disappeared completely from memory, but were 
assigned a place in a historical/hierarchical classification that made clear the 
superiority of the new mechanical natural philosophy.  First came the Pythagoreans 
and Platonists, who relied on symbols; next the Peripatetics with their tool box of 
principles, qualities, and attractions, whose “physicks is a kind of metaphysics.”  
The experimental philosophers, dominated by the chemists, made many discoveries, 
but fell into theories and hypotheses. The last were “the mechanical philosophers 
who explicate all the phenomena of nature by matter and motion ... by effluvia and 
subtle particles etc ... by the known and established laws of motion and mechanicks: 
And these are, in conjunction with the [experimental philosophers] the only true 
philosophers.”182  Natural philosophy remained a largely speculative search for a 
causal understanding of the regularities of nature, as Aristotle had defined it, but the 
forces for change, which accelerated the transformation of Aristotelianism during 
the Renaissance, unleashed in the seventeenth century a radical restructuring of the 
discipline around new premises, new practices, and new institutions. 
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Notes 
 
 
∗ I am grateful for helpful comments on earlier drafts of this piece to Roger Ariew, 
Laurence Brockliss, Mordechai Feingold, Anthony Grafton, and to the editors of this 
volume. 
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10. Willem Frijhoff, "Patterns," in Universities in Early Modern Europe, pp. 43-110, 
esp. p. 71.  On German foundations, see Beiträge zu Problemen deutscher 
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